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  This	   article	   starts	   from	   the	   premise	   that	   critically	   engaging	   the	   movements,	  sensations,	  qualities,	  techniques	  and	  affects	  of	  everyday	  experience	  will	  give	  insight	  into	   designing	   research-­‐creation	   strategies	   for	   agentive	   embodiment.	   Research-­‐creation	   proposes	   the	   possibility	   of	   becoming	   newly	   sensitive	   to	   affective	   and	  sensorial	   influences	   via	   material	   and	   medial	   negotiation	   which,	   in	   turn,	   can	  modulate	   habits	   of	   attention	   and	   the	   way	   we	   tend	   to	   everyday	   experience.	   How,	  then,	  can	  research-­‐creation	  processes	  activate	  agency	  in	  habit,	  which	  is	  entwined	  in	  personal	  histories	  of	  emotion	  and	  perception,	  so	  that	  it	  can	  become	  a	  creative	  force	  in	  both	  personal	  and	  collective	  contexts?	  To	   explore	   this	   issue,	   I	   have	   composed	   a	   series	   of	   thematic	   gatherings	   that	  integrate	   theoretical,	   reflective	   and	   artistic	   examples.	   I	   first	   consider	   everyday,	  material	   interaction	   as	   a	   process	   of	   emergent	   embodiment.	   I	   then	   explore	   how	  agency	   is	   constituted	   in	   embodied	   movement	   and	   sensation	   more	   specifically	   by	  extending	   the	  discussion	   of	   embodied	   agency	   to	   instances	  wherein	   felt	   sensations	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are	   intensified	   and	   generated	   via	   procedures	   within	   which	   to	   formalise	   it.	   I	  introduce	   ‘tactile	   drawing’,	   an	   exercise	   I	   designed	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   refocusing	  existing,	   linear	   perception	   parameters	   can	   generate	   emergent	   sensitivity	   in	   the	  movement	  and	  sensation	  of	   tactile	  experience.	   I	   then	  discuss	  embodied	  agency	  via	  the	   mediated,	   affective	   and	   perceptive	   intensification	   of	   research-­‐creation	  processes.	   Finally,	   I	   consider	   Sara	   Ahmed’s	   proposition	   that	   clumsiness	   can	  destabilise	  emotionally	  charged	  habits	  of	  boundary	  and	  social	  distinction.	  I	  suggest	  that	  engaging	  social	  frictions	  and	  tensions	  with	  clumsy	  non-­‐attunement	  in	  processes	  of	   research-­‐creation	   can	   generate	   emergent	   sensitivity	   across	   affectively	   charged	  social	  boundaries,	  manners	  and	  habits.	  My	  aim	  for	  this	  discussion	   is	   to	  develop	  both	  affective	  and	  critical	  resonances	  between	  theory,	  reflection	  and	  artistic	  expression,	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  a	  context	  with	  which	   to	   develop	   research-­‐creation	   from	   the	   often	   non-­‐conscious	   continuities	   of	  habit.	  The	  central	  theme	  of	  agency	  in	  habit	  is	  not	  examined	  for	  the	  discreet	  purpose	  of	  explaining	  it.	  Instead,	  the	  notion	  of	  embodied	  agency	  is	  a	  focalisation	  with	  which	  I	  engage	   the	  experience	  of	  habit,	   so	   that	  embodying	  processes	  can	  be	  designed	   that	  have	   the	   potential	   to	   intensify	   and	  modulate	   everyday	   experience.	  My	   theoretical	  contribution	   thus	   lies	   in	   composing	   a	   dynamic	   milieu	   for	   emergent	   thought	   and	  reflection,	   to	   bring	   theory	   closer	   to	   the	   development	   of	   agentive,	   inhabitable	   and	  socially	  pertinent	  embodiment	  processes.	  	  
—MATERIAL SCRIPTS  It	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   how	   everyday,	   embodied	   habits	   are	   developed	   via	  dynamic	  scripts	  or	  tendencies	  within	  material,	  relational	  milieux.	  For	  Elaine	  Scarry,	  the	  process	  of	  embodying	  an	  object	  is	  two-­‐fold.	  The	  body	  is	  anatomically	  augmented	  with	  specific	  prosthetic	  objects	  that	  prolong,	  transform	  and	  facilitate	  specific	  tasks,	  and	  project	  the	  perceptive	  limits	  of	  the	  body	  outwards.	  Correspondingly,	  these	  same	  objects	  are	  internalised,	  objectifying	  the	  body.1	  Scarry	  specifically	  elaborates	  on	  the	  perceptive	   relation	   of	   the	   internal	   and	   external	   body	   in	   instances	   when	   pain	   is	  relieved	   by	   extending	   sentience	   into	   ergonomic	   objects	   like	   furniture.	   When	   one	  relieves	   their	   pain	   by	   sitting	   on	   a	   chair,	   the	   body	   is	   objectified—it	   takes	   on	   ‘that	  blissful	  immunity	  of	  inert,	  inanimate	  objecthood’.2	  Meanwhile,	  the	  chair	  assumes	  the	  vulnerability	  and	  sentient	  consciousness	  of	  the	  relieved	  sufferer.	  Embodiment	  itself	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is	   thus	   a	   loose	   and	   porous	   dynamic	   of	   intensive	   surfacing	   with	   surrounding	  materiality:	   ‘a	   body-­‐is	   itself	   at	   its	   origins	   a	   profound	   registration	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  physical	  sentience	  has,	  after	  first	  projecting	  itself	  outward,	  then	  absorbed	  back	  into	  its	  own	  interior	  content	  the	  externalised	  objectifications	  of	  itself	  ‘.3	  In	  reference	  to	  Heidegger,	  Robin	  Bernstein	  distinguishes	  objects	  from	  things	  to	  better	  grasp	  the	  physical	  and	  psychological	  transformation	  that	  occurs	  when	  bodies	  move	  with	  things	  in	  processes	  of	  embodiment.	  Bernstein	  suggests	  that	  a	  distinction	  can	  be	  made	  between	  objects	  and	   things	  based	  on	   the	   level	  of	  ease	  and	   fluidity	  of	  their	  interrelationship	  with	  the	  body	  in	  use.	  Objects	  become	  things	  when	  ‘thing	  and	  person	  are	  unmoored	  from	  fixed	  positions	  of	  difference	  and	  twirl	  in	  sudden	  mutual	  orbit,	  each	  subject	  to	  the	  other’s	  gravity	  …	  an	  object	  becomes	  a	  thing	  when	  it	  invites	  a	   person	   to	   dance’.4	   Our	   relationships	   with	   things	   are	   thus	   not	   closed,	   automatic	  circuits	  of	  movement,	  but	  dynamic	  bodying	  processes	  in	  flux.	  	  In	   fact,	   the	  more	   invested	  we	   are	   in	   embodying	   a	   specific	   relational	   dynamic	  with	  an	  object,	  the	  more	  fluid	  our	  relationship	  with	  it	  becomes.	  For	  example,	  when	  cutting	  with	  a	  knife,	  the	  agility	  of	  grip	  or	  the	  pressure,	  span	  and	  rhythm	  of	  slicing	  are	  modulated	   with	   even	   greater	   subtlety	   and	   dynamism	   as	   our	   skill	   level	   increases.	  Embodied	  object	  scripts	  thus	  invite	  ‘an	  elastic	  resilience	  with	  a	  necessary	  openness	  to	  resistance,	   interpretation,	  and	   improvisation’.5	  The	  dynamics	  of	  attention	   in	   the	  movement	  of	  slicing	  is	  not	  strictly	  a	  concern	  for	  either	  body	  or	  object,	  for	  cutting	  or	  getting	  cut,	  but	  a	  negotiation	  of	  mutual	  co-­‐constitution.6	  William	  James	  further	  suggests	  that	  our	  understanding	  of	  materiality	  is	  purely	  relational.	   For	   James,	   our	   experience	  with	   objects,	   the	  way	   their	  material	   quality,	  weight,	   texture,	   temperature	   or	   resistance	   variably	   weighs	   on	   our	   attention	   in	  practice	  is	  all	  that	  we	  can	  know	  of	  them:	  ‘but	  denoting	  definitely	  felt	  transitions,	  lies	  all	  that	  the	  knowing	  of	  a	  percept	  by	  an	  idea	  can	  possibly	  contain	  or	  signify’.7	  What	  we	  perceive	  is	  then	  always	  mediated	  in	  shifting	  relations	  of	  desire	  and	  circumstance.	  David	  Ellison	  confirms	  that	   ‘we	  notice	  what	  we	  need	  or	  desire	  to	  know	  and	  negate	  the	  perceptibility	  of	  the	  which	  fails	  to	  meet	  these	  criteria’.8	  This	  relational	  emphasis	  does	   not	   undermine	   the	   significance	   of	   materiality	   but	   locates	   materiality	   as	   the	  precondition	   of	   sensation,	  which	   itself	   is	   felt	   and	   articulated	   in	   an	   active	   dynamic	  with	  the	  sensory	  materiality	  of	  the	  body.	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We	   can	   feel	   the	   dynamic	   attention	   of	   embodied	  materiality	   in	   action	   in	   Erin	  Manning’s	   ‘Dance	   of	   Attention’.	   This	   exercise	   specifically	   activates	   how	   we	  consciously	  inhabit	  material	  spaces	  that	  have	  been	  embodied	  over	  time.	  Participants	  lie	   flat	   on	   their	   backs	   and	  are	   given	   a	   series	   of	   verbal	   cues	   to	  help	   them	  mentally	  recreate	   the	  surrounding	  space.	  However,	   rather	   than	  assume	  that	  our	  memory	  of	  material	   interaction	   can	   be	   a	  matter	   of	   recalling	   a	   static	   and	   singular	   position	   or	  quality,	  we	   see	   that	   embodied	  attention	   is	   a	   force	   that	   actively	   generates	  material	  and	   spatial	   memory.	   Manning	   describes	   this	   process	   as	   a	   ‘body-­‐event	   of	   space	  timing’.9	   When	   we	   dance	   with	   ‘things’,	   we	   are	   dancing	   with	   embodied	   material	  experiences	  that	  are	  composed	  from	  and	  expressed	  in	  dynamic	  attention.	  	  I	   have	   experienced	   firsthand	   the	   dynamism	   of	   emergent	   sensorial	   sensitivity	  with	  particular	   intensity	  during	   the	  process	   of	   learning	   to	   form	  plastic	   clay	   into	   a	  vessel	  on	  a	  potter’s	  wheel.	  This	  process	  requires	  gradually	  embodying	  a	  subtle	  and	  tactile	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  weight	  and	  consistency	  of	  spinning	  clay.	  The	  process	  is	  unique	  in	  the	  complexity,	  sensitivity	  and	  immediacy	  of	  sensory	  feedback.	  
When	  I	  was	  first	  learning	  to	  throw	  pottery,	  the	  multitude	  of	  undifferentiated	  
sensations	  bombarded	  my	  attention	  and	  I	  was	  unsure	  of	  their	  causal	  effects	  on	  the	  
clay-­‐forming	  process.	  For	  example,	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  pressure	  of	  touch	  on	  the	  clay	  were	  
very	  different	  depending	  on	  its	  humidity	  and	  corresponding	  consistency.	  The	  speed	  of	  
the	  turning	  wheel	  also	  had	  a	  dramatic	  effect	  on	  my	  ability	  to	  negotiate	  and	  feel	  the	  
effects	  of	  the	  centrifugal	  force	  as	  it	  exerted	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  clay	  and	  against	  my	  
hands.	  For	  me	  as	  a	  beginner,	  the	  pressure	  dynamics	  involved	  in	  this	  process	  felt	  
extremely	  subtle	  and	  at	  times	  obscure.	  The	  degree	  of	  sensitivity	  required	  to	  press	  the	  
clay	  into	  the	  form	  required	  that	  I	  embody	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  habitual	  automatism.	  
Only	  once	  was	  I	  able	  to	  negotiate	  the	  weight	  and	  pressure	  of	  the	  clay	  with	  a	  practised,	  
accumulated	  muscle	  reflex	  that	  could	  successfully	  form	  the	  clay	  into	  a	  vessel	  form.	  I	  
noticed	  that	  subsequent,	  more	  expertly	  formed	  vessels	  became	  the	  expression	  of	  this	  
specific	  embodiment.	  The	  complexity	  and	  very	  specialised	  character	  of	  throwing	  made	  
me	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  perceptive	  and	  muscular	  sensitivity	  to	  
it—learning	  to	  throw	  became	  a	  process	  of	  designing	  my	  own	  embodiment.	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This	  example	  shows	  that	  learning	  to	  throw	  pottery	  is	  a	  process	  of	  learning	  to	  design	  vessel	   forms	   as	   much	   as	   it	   is	   a	   process	   of	   designing	   embodiment.	   This	   notion	   is	  inspiring	  in	  that	  it	  reveals	  how	  to	  explicitly	  develop	  embodied	  agency	  by	  inhabiting	  expressive	  techniques.	  How,	  then,	  can	  processes	  of	  designing	  agentive	  embodiment	  be	  developed	  in	  everyday	  and	  social	  contexts?	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  specifically	  examine	  agency	  in	  embodied	  movement.	  
—AGENCY IN MOVEMENT Movement	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  emergent	  dynamics	  of	  embodied	  perception	  in	  space.	  Bergson	  affirms	  that	  even	  micro-­‐perceptive	  movements	  like	  the	  shift	  of	  a	  glance	  or	  a	  muscle	   contraction	   are	   ‘neither	   the	   cause	   nor	   the	   result	   of	   its	   relation	   to	  phenomenon;	  they	  are	  part	  of	  it,	  they	  express	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  space’.10	  After	  Suzanne	  Langer,	  Massumi	  elaborates	  on	  the	  example	  of	  visual	  movement	  in	  a	   leafy	  motif	  to	  explain	  the	  embodied,	  spatial	  quality	  of	  movement	  expression.	  The	  cursive	   fluidity	  of	   the	   form	   visually	   motivates	   attention:	   'Every	   perception	   comes	   with	   its	   own	  "vitality	   affect"…	   that’s	   why	   we	   see	   movement	   in	   a	   motif.	   The	   form	   "naturally"	  poises	   the	  body	   for	   a	   certain	   set	  of	  potentials'.11	  This	  vitality	   effect	   is	   a	   sensing	  of	  aliveness	  that	  is	  felt	  self-­‐referentially	  ‘in	  the	  immediacy	  of	  its	  occurrence,	  as	  it	  is	  felt-­‐thinking-­‐feeling’.12	  This	   ‘thinking-­‐feeling’	   is	  how	  we	   feel	   the	  activity	  and	  agency	  of	  our	   participation	   in	   the	   process	   of	   perception,	   whether	   we	   are	   aware	   of	   all	   the	  embodied	  qualities	  that	  constitute	  perception	  at	  a	  given	  moment	  or	  not.	  Massumi	   clarifies	   the	   conceptual	   importance	   of	   understanding	   movement	   as	  embodied,	  emergent	  expression	  and	  not	  merely	  as	  the	  displacement	  of	  static	  bodies	  and	  positions.	  Positions	   can	  be	  easily	  mapped	  or	  plotted	  on	  a	   grid,	   accounting	   for	  multiplicity	   and	   displacement	   but	   not	   qualitative	   transformation,	   precluding	  emergent	   thought	   in	   motion.	   In	   motion,	   the	   potential	   of	   the	   body	   unfolds	   in	  variation;	   it	   ‘does	   not	   coincide	  with	   itself.	   It	   coincides	  with	   its	   own	   transition:	   its	  own	  variation’.13	  But,	  if	  even	  the	  slightest	  movements	  necessary	  for	  vision	  and	  other	  basic	  motor	  skills	  express	  subjective	  embodiment,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  can	  actively	  catalyse	  movement	  as	  a	  multiple	  and	  dynamic	  method	  of	  developing	  techniques	  for	  agentive	  embodiment	   remains.	  Massumi	   aptly	   states	   ‘the	  movement	   is	   always	   there	   in	   any	  case.	   So	   you	   have	   to	   make	   distinctions	   between	   kinds	   of	   movement,	   kinds	   of	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experiential	  dynamics,	   and	   then	  ask	  what	  difference	   they	  make.’14	  We	  can	   start	   to	  engage	  the	  impact	  of	  perception	  on	  experiences	  of	  agency	  by	  connecting	  perceptive	  movements	   to	   the	   impulses	   that	   shape	   everyday	   movements	   like	   walking	   or	  jumping.	  Manning	   insists	  that	   identifying	  specific	  movements	  resides	   in	  a	  retrospective	  awareness	   of	   it.	   However,	   this	   after-­‐the-­‐fact	   movement	   consciousness	   does	   not	  imply	   that	   we	   have	   no	   control	   over	   our	   movements.	   Instead,	   we	   actively	   pre-­‐accelerate	  movement	  via	  the	  embodied	  coordination	  of	  movements	  that	  have	  been	  travelled	  before	  but	  that	  resist	  precisely	  predetermined	  trajectories:	  Movement	   always	   begins	   with	   a	   certain	   degree	   of	   open	   improvisation	  mixed	  with	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  habit.	  Every	  step	  we	  take	  when	  we	  walk	  is	  a	  re-­‐playing	   of	   a	   habit	   …	   These	   habits	   hold	   our	   walk	   to	   a	   practised	  repetition:	  a	  choreography	  of	  sorts.	  Yet	  each	  of	  these	  habits	  takes	  its	  shape	  from	  a	  pre-­‐acceleration	  that	  proposes	  openings	  toward	  different	  shades	  of	  movement.15	  	  The	  potential	   for	   shifting	   experience	   in	  movement,	   then,	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   creating	   a	  context	   wherein	   divergent	   movement	   trajectories	   can	   emerge	   and	   develop	   from	  within	   the	   practised	   automatism	   of	   habit.	   Manning	   explores	   this	   potential	   by	  adapting	   the	   tango	   so	   that	   dance	   movements	   are	   systemically	   delayed	   and	  improvised.	  Dancing	  partners	  activate	  an	  affective	  exchange	  between	  them	  through	  the	  very	  materiality	  of	   their	  bodies	   in	  movement.	  The	  object	  of	   the	  dance	   is	  not	   a	  stable	  image,	  position	  or	  discreetly	  defined	  trajectory	  but	  the	  exchange	  of	  closeness	  in	   the	   immediacy	   of	   felt	   breath,	   boundary	   and	   anticipation	   or	   ‘a	   listening	   to	  what	  might	  be	  considered	  the	  very	  ethics-­‐in-­‐deconstruction	  of	  humanity’.16	  For	  Manning,	  this	  is	  an	  ethical	  encounter	  with	  the	  other	  in	  which	  movement	  is	  a	  central	  force	  for	  rethinking	  dominant	  subject	  categorisations.	  The	  choreographies	  of	  Meg	  Stuart,	  including	  Forgeries,	  Love	  and	  Other	  Matters	  (2004),	   All	   Together	   Now	   (2008)	   and	   The	   Fault	   Lines	   (2010),	   also	   generate	   a	  performative	   context	   that	   transforms	   everyday	   impulses	   to	   movement	   and	  embodiment.17	   The	  minutia	   of	   a	   gesture	   that	   is	   as	   slight	   as	   shaking	   one’s	   head	   or	  extending	   a	   hand	   is	   distilled	   into	   a	   brief	   and	   potent	   physical	   manifestation.	   The	  figural	  body	   is	  abstracted	  and	  deconstructed	   from	  everyday	   familiarity	   in	   the	   fast-­‐paced	   intensity	   of	   fragmented	   or	   incomplete	   repetition	   of	   gestures.	   Unlike	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Manning’s	  tango,	  which	  stretches	  movement	  out	  to	  make	  room	  for	  new	  experiences	  within	   practised	   tendencies,	   Stuart’s	   bodies	   are	   condensed	   and	   accelerated	   to	   the	  limit	  of	  physical	  capacity.	  In	  Stuart’s	  extreme	  movement	  sequences,	  embodied	  poses	  are	   elasticised,	   contaminated	   and	   hybridised	   in	   emergent	   and	   fluid	   spatial	  expression.18	  This	   is	  a	  severe	  redistribution	  of	  embodied	  movement	  and	  expresses	  the	  intensity	  of	  inhabiting	  the	  threshold	  of	  an	  elastic	  body.	  Embodied	   movement	   is	   clearly	   one	   parameter	   with	   which	   to	   instigate	  strategies	   for	   modulating	   habitual	   trajectories.	   But	   movement	   is	   not	   the	   only	  parameter	   with	   which	   to	   account	   for	   felt	   experience.	   The	   affective	   and	   sensorial	  textures	   of	   experience	   play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   our	   ability	   to	  modulate	   attention	   and	  thus	  our	  embodied	  agency	  with	  the	  materiality	  of	  the	  everyday.	  
—AGENCY IN SENSATION  Like	   movement,	   discreet	   sensations	   in	   habit	   are	   entangled	   in	   the	   immediacy	   of	  experience.	  But,	  unlike	  movement,	  which	  is	  always	  only	  known	  by	  our	  retrospective	  awareness	   of	   it,	   sensation	   gives	   us	   access	   to	   immediately	   palpable,	   material	  awareness.	  What’s	  more,	  our	  experience	  of	  sensation	  enables	  us	  to	  shift	  movement	  tendencies	  in	  process.	  For	  Bergson,	  this	  ability	  to	  feel	  in	  movement	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	   sensory	   agency:	   pain	   and	   pleasure	   resist	   habitual	   automatism	   as	   a	   form	   of	  ‘nascent	   freedom	  …	   [sensations	   foresee]	   future	   automatic	  movements	   in	   the	   very	  midst	  of	  the	  sensation’.19	  Tim	  Bayne	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  knowledge	  and	  agency	  are	  embedded	  and	   developed	   through	   sensory	   perception.	   For	   Bayne,	   agentive	   experiences	   are	  best	  thought	  of	  as	  perceptual	  experiences,	  which	  is	  the	  mode	  in	  and	  through	  which	  we	   are	   self-­‐aware	   and	   the	   condition	   for	   our	   consciousness	   of	   agency.	   Perceptual	  organs	   cannot	   then	   be	   conceived	   as	   passive	   perceptions,	   but	   are	   organs	   that	  generate	   awareness	   as	   part	   of	   their	   phenomenology.20	   Sensory	   information	   thus	  constitutes	  experience	  in	  dynamic	  and	  elastic	  interrelationships	  that	  are	  not	  always	  conscious	  but	  nonetheless	  inform	  our	  actions,	  agency	  and	  subjectivity.	  Sensory	   agency	   is	   perhaps	   experienced	   most	   directly	   with	   intensely	   felt	  sensations.	  For	  example,	  when	  skin	  comes	   into	  contact	  with	  a	  hot	  surface	  or	  a	   toe	  hits	  a	  hard	  corner	   in	  mid	  step,	   the	   feeling	  of	   intense	  pain	  provokes	  an	   immediate,	  often	  involuntary,	  physical	  response.	  However,	  our	  physical	  response	  to	  less	  intense	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sensations	  is	  also	  mediated	  in	  quasi-­‐automatic	  movements	  that	  activate	  perceptive	  sensitivity.	  As	  Dewey	  explains:	  ‘Habit	  means	  special	  sensitiveness	  or	  accessibility	  to	  certain	  classes	  of	  stimuli,	  predilections	  and	  aversions,	  rather	  than	  bare	  recurrence	  of	  specific	  acts.'21	  Embodied	  sensitivity	   to	  sensory	   information	   is	   thus	  developed	  and	  modulated	   over	   the	   long-­‐term	   investment	   in	   refining	   patterns	   and	   tendencies	   of	  physical	  and	  reflexive	  co-­‐ordination:	   ‘To	  single	  out	  a	  definitive	  sensory	  element	   in	  any	  field	  is	  evidence	  of	  training.’22	  Agentive	  embodiment	  is	  then	  the	  expression	  of	  an	  accumulation	   of	   trained	   body-­‐creation	   or	   culturally,	   physically	   and	   affectively	  mediated	  sensitivities	  and	  aversions,	  which	  are	  constituted	  as	  subjective	  tendencies	  rather	  than	  fully	  conscious,	  discreetly	  defined	  acts.	  	  Deleuze	  emphasises	   the	   role	  of	   the	  plastic,	  perceptive	   capacity	  of	   the	  body	   in	  sensory	   agency.	   He	   explains	   that	   sensory	   experience	   is	   synthesised	   by	   the	   living,	  embodied	   present,	   ‘the	   thousands	   of	   habits	   that	   compose	   us,	   our	   contradictions,	  thoughts,	  pretensions,	  presumptions,	  satisfactions,	  fatigues	  and	  variable	  presents—form	  the	  base	  domain	  of	  passive	  synthesis’.23	  Since	  habitual	  reflexes	  actively	  shape	  perception,	   this	  means	   that	   ‘we	  must	  attribute	  a	   contemplative	   spirit	   to	   the	  heart,	  muscles,	   nerves	   and	   cells	   whose	   role	   is	   to	   contract	   habit’.24	   Therefore,	   embodied	  agency	   is	   delocalised	   from	   a	   contained	   body	   or	   object.	   Instead,	   agency	   is	   an	  activation	  of	  the	  flux	  between	  the	  body	  and	  the	  material	  environment,	  in	  a	  dynamic	  negotiation	  of	   inhabited	   tendencies	   to	  movement	  and	  affective	  sensitivity	  with	   the	  immediate.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  earlier	  example	  of	  learning	  to	  throw	  pottery,	  embodied,	  sensory	   agency	   does	   not	   correlate	   with	   being	   fully	   conscious	   of	   all	   the	   physical	  details	   and	   perceptions	   that	   go	   into	   a	   particular	   movement.	   Ellison	   points	   to	   the	  instances	   when	   we	   first	   notice	   a	   clearly	   articulated	   background	   noise	   that	   was	  always	  there	  to	  begin	  with	  as	  awareness	  of	  our	  selective	  consciousness.	  The	  routine	  indifference	   to	   these	   kinds	   of	   aural	   details	   is	   an	   expression	   of	   the	   dynamism	   of	  conscious	  and	  non-­‐conscious	  sensation:	  it	  is	  both	  the	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  focusing	  on	  an	   isolated	   sensory	   dynamic	   (or	   of	   honing	   techniques	   that	   require	   particular	  sensory	  refinement)	  and	  the	  ‘necessary	  precondition	  of	  its	  return	  to	  perceptibility’.25	  Habit,	  then,	  is	  never	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  developing	  a	  relative	  consistency	  in	  action,	  but	  is	  constituted	  in	  a	  relational	  milieu	  of	  competing,	  sensory	  stimuli.	  This	  explains	  the	  feeling	  of	  stability	  when	  attention	  is	  streamlined	  during	  the	  practice	  of	  a	  given	  skill.
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This	   felt	   stability	   is	   immediately	  experienced	  as	   improved	  balance	   if	  one	   imagines	  that	  a	  string	  is	  attached	  to	  the	  head	  and	  connected	  to	  the	  ceiling,	  holding	  them	  up.	  	  To	   complicate	   the	   issue	   further,	   the	   felt	   sensations,	   affections	   and	   reflections	  that	  make	   up	   experience	   are	   not	   discreetly	   defined	   entities	   but	   are	   condensed	   in	  shared	   reflexive	   tendencies	   that	   become	   indistinguishable	   and	   interchangeable.	  Even	   the	   most	   mundane	   experience	   of	   sensory	   perception	   can	   incite	   a	   deeply	  emotional	   response.	   Bergson	   outlines	   the	   difficulty	   of	   differentiating	   what	   we	  perceive	  as	  magnitude	  and	  sensory	  extensities	  that	  pertain	  equally	  to	  psychic	  states,	  muscular	  effort	  and	  pain:	  We	  are	   thus	   led	   to	  define	   the	   intensity	  of	  a	   superficial	  effort	   in	   the	  same	  way	  as	   that	  of	   a	  deep-­‐seated	  psychic	   feeling	  …	  a	   feeling	  which,	   retaining	  the	   same	   name,	   grows	   without	   changing	   its	   nature	   …	   Sometimes	   these	  superficial	   elements	   are	   co-­‐ordinated	   by	   a	   purely	   speculative	   idea,	  sometimes	  by	  an	  idea	  of	  a	  practical	  order.26	  Bergson’s	   observations	   about	   the	   interchangeability	   of	   psychic	   and	   sensorial	  responsiveness	   are	   clinically	   affirmed.	   Ronald	   Melzack	   and	   Patrick	   Wall’s	   1965	  essay,	   ‘Gate	  Control	  Theory	  of	  Pain’,	  which	  continues	   to	  underscore	  contemporary	  pain	   research,	   shows	   that	   touch,	   pressure	   and	  vibration	   signals	   are	   shared	  on	   the	  same	  spinal	  cord	  fibres	  and	  often	  interact.	  The	  shared	  neuro-­‐signalling	  involved	  in	  sensory	   perception	   can	   be	   experienced	   first	   hand	   by	   rubbing	   a	   bumped	   knee	   or	  elbow	   to	   generate	   the	   sense	   of	   vibration,	   which	   prevents	   painful	   sensory	  transmission	   to	   the	  brain.	  What	   is	  especially	   fascinating	   is	   that	   the	   interconnected	  biological	   formation	   of	   spinal	   and	   neural	   transmission	   is	   not	   static	   or	   hard-­‐wired	  but	   alive	   and	   continually	   changing.27	   Therefore,	   the	   physical	   links	   or	   associations	  that	  we	  make	  between	   sensorial	   registers	   in	  practice	   actively	   and	  physically	   form	  our	  subjective,	  perceptive	  disposition.	  
—AGENCY IN ATTENTION Examples	  from	  empirical	  research	  show	  how	  measurement	  apparatus	  activate	  and	  intensify	   sensation	  according	   to	   the	   constraints	  of	   their	  measurement	  parameters.	  Let	   us	   now	   consider	   a	   few	   examples	   of	   this	   process,	   which	   will	   in	   turn	   help	   to	  conceptualise	  possible	  new	  procedures	  for	  developing	  ways	  of	  affectively	  tending	  to	  the	  everyday	  environment.28	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Massumi	  describes	  an	  experiment	  by	  David	  Katz	   that	  measures	   the	   impact	  of	  emotion	   on	   perception	   within	   the	   specific	   parameters	   of	   a	   test	   scenario.	   In	   the	  experiment,	   participants	   were	   asked	   to	   remember	   the	   colour	   of	   an	   object	   that	  carries	   emotional	   or	   personal	   importance	   to	   them.	   Participants	   consistently	  remembered	   a	   ‘striking	   particularity’	   of	   the	   colour,	   rather	   than	   the	   colour	   itself,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  colour	  memory	  that	  was	  excessive	  in	  saturation	  and	  intensity.29	  In	   the	   Katz	   test	   scenario,	   the	   affective	   parameters	   of	   the	   experiment	   focalise	  memory	  so	  that	  the	  perception	  of	  colour	  is	  intensified.	  Excessive	  saturation	  emerges	  in	  the	  focalised	  co-­‐constitution	  or	  conflation	  of	  emotional	  and	  perceptive	  registers.	  A	  recent	  experiment	  published	  by	  the	  International	  Association	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Pain	   (IASP)	   similarly	   creates	   an	   excess	   of	   pain	   intensity	   by	   combining	   the	  experience	  of	   thermally	   induced	  pain	  with	  affect	  as	  described	  by	   facial	  expression.	  The	  study	  concludes	  that	  patients	  felt	  substantially	  more	  pain	  when	  simultaneously	  viewing	   more	   intense	   illustrations	   of	   pain.30	   Like	   the	   Katz	   experiment,	   this	   test	  scenario	   demonstrates	   that	   sensation	   is	   significantly	   modulated	   by	   the	   agentive	  dynamic	  in	  the	  measurement	  apparatus	  itself.	  From	   these	   examples	   we	   can	   see	   that	   empirical	   measurement	   processes	  participate	  in	  the	  production	  of	  sensation.	  When	  we	  contrast	  empirical	  methods	  of	  pain	   self-­‐assessment	  with	  more	   open	   pain	   description	   systems,	   the	   complexity	   of	  this	  process	  comes	  further	  to	  light.	  The	  ‘Schmidt	  Pain	  Index’	  is	  an	  index	  that	  Justin	  O.	  Schmidt	   developed	   to	   rank	   the	   sensations	   of	   the	   sting	   of	   seventy-­‐eight	   different	  wasp	   species.	   Rather	   than	   reduce	   sensations	   to	   intensity	   alone,	   Schmidt	   explores	  textual	  association,	  metaphor	  and	  comparison	  to	  describe	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	   intensity,	   as	   well	   as	   physical	   and	   emotional	   effects	   in	   sensation.	   For	   example,	  
Paraponera	   clavata	   stings	   induce	   ‘immediate,	   excruciating	   pain	   and	   numbness	   to	  pencil-­‐point	   pressure,	   as	  well	   as	   trembling	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   totally	   uncontrollable	  urge	   to	   shake	   the	  affected	  part’.31	  The	  Yellow	   Jacket	   sting	   is	  described	  using	  more	  poetic	   associations.	   It	   is	   ‘hot	   and	   smoky,	   almost	   irreverent.	   Imagine	   W.C.	   Fields	  extinguishing	  a	  cigar	  on	  your	  tongue’.32	  The	  attempt	  to	  describe	  sensation	  without	  the	  constraint	  of	  a	   linear,	   intensive	  constraint,	   reveals	   the	  potential	   for	  generating	  complex,	   expressive	   outcomes	   from	   perceptive	   focalisation.	   Sensation	   is	   activated	  and	   transformed	   in	   the	   very	   parameters	   used	   to	   measure,	   articulate	   and	   reflect	  upon	  it.	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Sensory articulation scale: 
	  
Slight sensation                         Vaguely articulated sensation                              Clearly articulated sensation 	  
Figure 1: Drawings made by participants of the 'Tactile Drawing' workshop. The various examples 
demonstrate the participants' attempts to negotiate the visual articulation of sensation, as it is felt in 
continuous movement as compared to in periodic instances (notice the drawn 'pulses' of sensation, 
far right), as well as the tactile variation that is simultaneously felt on different areas of the fingertip. 	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experience	  within	   the	   open	   shifting	  milieu	   of	   tactile	   perception.	   These	   include:	   a)	  continuity/periodicity	  or	  accounting	  for	  the	  way	  that	  edges	  or	  small	  details	  are	  felt	  differently	   when	   the	   finger	   tip	   approaches	   them	   as	   compared	   to	   when	   it	   moves	  along	   and	   past	   them;	   b)	   fingertip	   area	   or	   the	   way	   sensations	   are	   articulated	  differently	  on	  different	  areas	  of	  the	  fingertip;	  c)	  hybrid	  distortion	  or	  negotiating	  the	  way	   surfaces	   are	   perceived	   as	   a	   quality	   of	   embodied	   fingertip	   sensation	   and	   as	  compared	   to	   the	   specific	  materiality	   of	   a	   surface;	   d)	   increasing	   or	   decreasing	   the	  pressure	   of	   a	   finger	   tip	   when	   moving	   against	   a	   surface	   to	   modulate	   the	   form	   of	  sensory	   detail	   and	   intensity;	   e)	   increasing	   or	   decreasing	   the	   speed	   of	   a	   finger	   tip	  moving	   against	   a	   surface	   to	  modulate	   the	   form	   of	   sensory	   detail	   and	   intensity;	   f)	  pulling/tautness	   of	   the	   skin	   or	   considering	   how	   the	   sensation	   of	   pulling	   the	   skin	  modulates	   sensory	   emphasis	   or	   articulation;	   g)	   vibration/tickle	   or	   notating	   the	  sensation	  of	  a	  tickle	  or	  vibration	  that	  is	  felt	  up	  the	  length	  of	  the	  finger;	  h)	  drawing	  technique	  or	  how	  the	  specificity	  of	  line	  and	  shading	  can	  create	  an	  appropriate	  scale	  to	  articulate	  how	  sensations	  are	  felt.	  	  Within	   these	   notational	   parameters	   remain	   challenges	   that	   complicate	   some	  participants’	   ability	   to	   directly	   notate	   their	   tactile	   experience.	   For	   example,	  participants	   occasionally	   become	   involved	   in	   notating	   the	   time	   of	   sensation	   in	  discreet	  movement	  periods	  rather	  than	  a	  continuous	  experience	  of	  sensation	  in	  real-­‐time.	   In	   these	   instances	   participants	   often	   describe	   the	   sequential	   rhythms	   that	  correspond	  to	  the	  time	  that	  it	  takes	  for	  the	  span	  of	  the	  fingertip	  to	  traverse	  an	  equal	  length	  of	  surface.33	  A	   second	   important	   consideration	   in	   tactile	   drawing	   is	   the	   choreography	   of	  touch	  or	  the	  touching	  techniques	  required	  to	  feel	  complex	  surface	  textures.	  To	  feel	  textured	  details	  the	  finger	  must	  delicately	  move	  with	  them,	  maintaining	  consistent	  contact	  without	  excessive	  pressure	  or	  speed.	  For	  example,	  the	  fingertip	  must	  lightly	  move	  over	  soft	  towel	  fibres	  so	  they	  do	  not	  flatten	  into	  a	  homogenous	  texture	  under	  the	   weight	   of	   the	   finger	   when	   it	   moves	   over	   them.	   It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   avoid	  fingertip	  desensitisation.	  If	  the	  fingertip	  moves	  over	  a	  surface	  with	  excessive	  speed	  and	  pressure,	   the	   finger	  vibrates	  and	   the	  nerve	  endings	   that	   register	  pressure	  are	  desensitised.	   This	   makes	   detailed	   and	   sensitive	   notations	   of	   tactile	   articulation	  impossible.	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Appropriate	  scaling	  is	  also	  important	  for	  becoming	  aware	  of	  emergent	  sensory	  details	   in	   the	   tactile	   experience.	   I	   have	   found	   that	   traditional	   drawing	   techniques	  that	   start	   with	   a	   very	   light	   grade	   pencil	   and	   which	   progressively	   include	   heavier	  grades	  of	  pencil	  to	  articulate	  darker	  and	  more	  specific	  lines	  is	  a	  very	  useful	  strategy.	  I	   encourage	   participants	   to	   begin	   the	   notation	   process	   by	  mapping	   out	   a	   general	  feeling	  of	   slight	   sensation	  using	   the	   light	  blue	  pencil	   and	   then	  gradually	   introduce	  the	   other	   colours	   to	   relationally	   define	   more	   clearly	   articulated	   sensations.	   This	  creates	  a	  relational	   field	  or	  reference	  system	   in	  which	   finely	  scaled	  sensations	  can	  emerge	  in	  relation	  to	  more	  obviously	  felt	  sensations,	  greatly	  increasing	  the	  detail	  of	  tactile	  articulation.	  When	   performed	   successfully,	   tactile	   drawing	   becomes	   an	   exercise	   in	  producing	  differentiations	  that	  recover	  tactile	  quality	  from	  the	  reductive	  parameter	  of	  the	  intensive	  self-­‐assessment	  scale.	  This	  process	  gives	  the	  participant	  access	  to	  a	  large	  range	  of	  sensorial	  qualities	  that	  were	  previously	  unnoticed	  since	  there	  was	  no	  attentive	  frame	  or	  parameter	  within	  which	  to	  experience	  them.	  This	  is	  seen	  perhaps	  most	  strikingly	  in	  the	  variety	  of	  ways	  the	  feeling	  of	  a	  textured	  surface	  is	  articulated	  and	   how	   tactile	   sensation	   often	   appears	   to	   shift	   the	   participants’	   attention	  parameters	  over	   the	   course	  of	  doing	   the	  exercise.	  This	   is	  because	   in	   the	   search	   to	  feel	  and	  articulate	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  tactile	  experience,	  different	  points	  of	  focus	  are	  sequentially	  employed	  to	  resensitise	  attention.34	  Although	  the	  emergent	  sensation	  of	  tactility	  in	  tactile	  drawing	  is	  of	  a	  relatively	  small	   scale,	   it	   speaks	   to	   the	   much	   more	   urgent	   issue	   of	   how	   habits	   of	   attention	  sensitise	  and	  desensitise	   the	   rich	  complexity	  of	  perceptive	  experience	   in	  everyday	  life.	  Given	  the	  interconnected	  character	  of	  emotion	  and	  sensation	  in	  felt	  experience,	  we	   cannot	   underestimate	   how	   deeply	   habits	   of	   perception	   inform	   even	   the	   most	  natural-­‐seeming	   social	   and	   emotional	   tendencies.	  What’s	  more,	   in	   tactile	   drawing	  we	   see	   that	   the	   way	   we	   understand	   the	   boundary	   of	   our	   physical	   extremities	   is	  constituted	  in	  the	  plastic	  dynamism	  of	  perceptive	  experience.	  Tactile	  drawing	  thus	  proposes	  a	  mode	  of	   figurative	   representation	   that	  does	  not	   reduce	   the	  body	   to	  an	  impermeable,	   visual	   outline,	   but	   expresses	   a	   plastic,	   agentive	   experience	   of	   body	  surfacing	  in	  touch.	  The	  felt	  emergence	  of	  sensation	  that	  is	  experienced	  via	  the	  tactile	  drawing	   exercise	   brings	   us	   to	   consider	   how	   the	   sensorial,	   material	   and	   medial	  dynamics	  of	  research-­‐creation	  become	  a	  milieu	  of	  emergent	  embodiment.	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—DESIGNING TECHNIQUES OF AGENTIVE EMBODIMENT IN RESEARCH-CREATION Tactile	   drawing	   reveals	   that	   moving,	   sensing	   and	   measuring	   are	   always	   situated	  within	  an	  emergent,	  relational	  ecology	  and	  guided	  in	  dynamics	  of	  attention.	  Like	  the	  formalism	   of	   the	   apparatus,	   research-­‐creation	   processes	   specifically	   pressurise	  attention	   and	   sensitivity	   within	   a	   given	   media	   and	   material	   milieu.	   But,	   the	  complexity	  in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  condense	  and	  perceive	  sensory	  information	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  only	  develop	  sensory	  agency	  in	  practice,	  in	  the	  felt	  experience	  of	  doing.	  	  Thomas	   Lamarre	   confirms	   that	   sensory	   agency	   in	   experience	   can	   only	   be	  understood	   during	   the	   immediate	   process	   of	   its	   actualisation.	   For	   Lamarre,	   the	  transfer	   of	   sentience	  manifested	   as	   physical	   consciousness	   between	   the	   body	   and	  material	  surroundings	  during	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  specific	  task	  is	  exemplified	  most	  explicitly	   at	   the	   threshold	   of	   tactility.	   Lamarre	   uses	   calligraphy	   to	   describe	   a	  becoming	   in	   sensory	   agency	   that	   recreates	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	   body:	   ‘The	  discipline	  of	  calligraphy	  …	  constitutes	  a	  radical	  mutilation	  and	  mutation	  of	  the	  body.	  In	   particular,	   there	   is	   an	   amputation	   of	   the	   hand	   in	   favor	   of	   a	   new	   prosthetic	  hand/brush	   that	   transforms	   modes	   of	   touching.’35	   The	   condition	   of	   movement	  amplifies	  the	  effect	  of	  inverting	  the	  interior	  and	  exterior	  body	  at	  the	  specific	  location	  where	  the	  hand	  holds	  the	  brush:	  the	  ink	  that	  metaphorically	  bleeds	  from	  the	  brush	  loosens	  the	  sensory	  body	  from	  its	  contained	  physical	  form.	  	  In	   the	   example	   of	   calligraphy	   ink,	   paper	   and	   brush	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	  specifically	  sensitising	  habitual	  tendencies	  to	  movement.	  The	  limitations	  of	  the	  body	  are	   reformed	   in	   the	   relational	   negotiation	  of	  materiality—the	   spring	   of	   the	  brush,	  the	   viscosity	   of	   the	   ink,	   the	   texture,	   weight	   and	   porosity	   of	   the	   paper	   and	   brush	  bristles,	   body	   posture,	   the	   embodied	   skill	   or	   technique	   that	   is	   characteristic	   of	   a	  particular	  style	  or	  technique	  of	  brushwork	  or	  way	  of	  holding	  the	  brush.	  Once	  again,	  the	  issue	  of	  process	  does	  not	  simply	  amount	  to	  the	  steps	  involved	  in	  reshaping	  the	  materiality	   of	   everyday	   objects.	   Instead,	   the	   particular	   affordances	   of	   a	   given	  material	   or	   medial	   technique	   initiate	   movements	   towards	   an	   inhabitable	   sensory	  sensitivity	  that	  stretch	  beyond	  existing	  limits	  of	  the	  subjective	  self.	  Like	  in	  the	  doing	  of	  calligraphy,	  this	  process	  is	  felt	  with	  particular	  intensity	  in	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  to	  throw	  pottery.	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During	  my	  experience	  learning	  to	  throw	  pottery,	  I	  participated	  in	  a	  process	  of	  identifying,	   curtailing	   and	   transforming	   everyday	   embodied	   habits	   by	   negotiating	  specific	  formalism,	  technology	  and	  materiality.	  
While	  throwing	  a	  cup,	  the	  walls	  of	  the	  soft	  clay	  vessel	  can	  only	  be	  felt	  from	  a	  single	  
point	  on	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  fingers	  or	  knuckles.	  The	  clay	  forms	  into	  shape	  as	  it	  is	  forced	  
through	  the	  narrow	  passage	  of	  two	  nearly	  touching	  fingertips.	  The	  cup	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  
object	  of	  material	  stability	  acquired	  over	  time	  from	  the	  embodied	  memory	  of	  holding	  
countless	  cups	  in	  the	  past.	  By	  forming	  a	  cup	  from	  plastic	  clay,	  the	  stability	  of	  my	  past	  
experience	  holding	  solid	  cups	  is	  transformed	  into	  an	  emergent	  process	  that	  is	  in	  flux	  
with	  the	  body.	  All	  previous	  experience	  with	  cups	  must	  temporarily	  be	  ignored	  or	  
deliberately	  unformed	  in	  embodied	  consciousness	  to	  successfully	  articulate	  a	  cup	  in	  the	  
plastic	  malleability	  of	  the	  throwing	  process.	  The	  affective	  disparity	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
throwing	  and	  using	  a	  cup	  is	  felt	  most	  acutely	  when	  the	  rim	  of	  a	  cup	  is	  no	  longer	  felt	  as	  
a	  stable	  point	  that	  supports	  the	  lips	  while	  drinking,	  but	  as	  a	  dynamic	  articulation	  that	  
is	  felt	  in	  a	  flux	  of	  movement,	  time	  and	  tactility	  with	  the	  spinning	  clay.	  Although	   learning	   to	   throw	   pottery	   is	   a	   gradual	   process	   of	   self-­‐reflexively	  embodying	  technique,	  which	  potentiates	  the	  further	  creative	  design	  of	  vessel	  forms,	  the	   training	   involved	   in	   this	   process	   is	   not	   a	   technical	   means	   to	   a	   creative	   end.	  Instead,	  habits	  of	  technique	  and	  aesthetic	  sensitivity	  are	  simultaneously	  developed,	  refined	  and	  embodied	  via	  the	  training	  process.	  Despite	  this	  confluence	  of	  technical	  and	   aesthetic	   embodiment,	   it	   remains	   important	   to	   conceptualise	   the	   embodied	  emergence	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  doing	  of	  research-­‐creation	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  doing	  of	  technical	  skill.	  	  After	   Deleuze,	   Andrew	   Murphy	   distinguishes	   the	   probabilistic	   yet	   shifting	  continuities	   in	   habit	   from	   the	   more	   complex	   and	   discontinuous	   synaptic	  relationships	   that	   are	   involved	   in	   creative	   thought	   patterns.	  Murphy	   explains	   that	  creative	   tracings	   ‘face	   up	   to	   discontinuities	   …	   making	   something	   new	   of	   them	  (entirely	   new	   syntheses)—“in	   which	   there	   is	   a	   gap	   that	   must	   be	   jumped”’.36	  Although	   Murphy	   separates	   habitual	   continuity	   from	   creative	   ‘jumps’,	   he	   also	  affirms	   that	   both	   ‘habit	   and	   creative	   discontinuities	   will	   always	   be	   found	   in	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combination’	   and	   will	   contribute	   to	   ‘the	   complexity	   of	   the	   probabilistic	   nature	   of	  synaptic	  activity’.37	  To	  understand	  what	  is	  specific	  to	  embodied	  creative	  processes	  as	  compared	  to	  embodiment	   processes	   in	   general	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   the	   implications	   of	  	  ‘making	   something	   new’.	   Newness	   as	   an	   attribute	   of	   creative	   expression	   is	   more	  complex	   than	   it	   seems	   since	   the	   process	   of	   learning	   a	   technical	   skill	   equally	  potentiates	  embodied	  expression	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  sensory	  distribution,	  sensitivity	  and	   affect.	   However,	   technical	   expertise	   is	   also	   a	   process	   of	   streamlining	   and	  reducing	   emergent	   sensation	   within	   the	   parameters	   of	   an	   existing	   format	   or	  system—technical	  training	  is	  a	  means	  to	  achieving	  a	  pre-­‐specified	  end.38	  In	  technical	  training	  we	  often	  become	  desensitised	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  creative	  emergence.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  practice	  of	  poising	  oneself	  to	  creatively	  respond	  to	  or	  ‘face	  up’	  to	  the	  discontinuities	  of	  experience,	  or	  the	  moments	  of	  sensory	  flux	  that	  are	  felt	  by	  tending	   to	   the	   immediate,	   constitutes	   a	   systemic	   openness	   to	   experience	   that	   is	  beyond	  habit	  or	  training.	  The	  example	  of	  tactile	  drawing	  shows	  us	  that	  this	   ‘facing	  up’	  is	  less	  a	  posture	  towards	  occupying	  a	  ‘gap’	  or	  a	  ‘jump’	  that	  is	  completely	  severed	  from	   existing	   habitual	   tendencies,	   but	   a	   newly	   sensitive	   engagement	   that	   is	   only	  possible	  from	  within	  habitual	  continuities.	  Sensory	  agency	  in	  creative	  expression	  is	  then	   a	   process	   of	   developing	   affective	   sensitivities	   from	   within	   the	   dynamic	   flux	  experience,	   which	   is	   always	   constituted	   in	   a	   milieu	   of	   emergent	   sensorial	  motivations.	  Bergson	  affirms	  the	  intensive,	  expressive	  potential	  of	  sensation:	  	  If	   the	  art	  which	  gives	  only	  sensations	  is	  an	  inferior	  art,	   the	  reason	  is	  that	  analysis	   often	   fails	   to	   discover	   in	   a	   sensation	   anything	   beyond	   the	  sensation	   itself.	   But	   the	   greater	  number	  of	   emotions	   are	   instincts	  with	   a	  thousand	  sensations,	  feelings	  or	  ideas	  which	  pervade	  them.39	  In	   creative	  media	   and	  material	   contexts,	   embodied,	   perceptive	   impressions	   of	   the	  world	  are	  quickly	  and	  easily	  reconfigured	  in	  infinite	  permutations,	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  pressuring	  attention	  in	  new	  trajectories.	  This	  process	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  wrestling	  with	   a	   partially	   formed	   vessel	   or	   sculpture,	   transforming	   an	   image	   of	   the	   world	  within	   the	   spatial	   and	   formal	   parameters	   of	   editing	   software	   or	   attempting	   to	  visually	   represent	   the	   details	   of	   a	   scene	   with	   a	   thick	   and	   chalky	   utensil.	   These	  material	   or	   medial	   transformations	   emerge	   through	   the	   plasticity	   of	   affective	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embodiment	   itself	   as	   they	   reconfigure,	   absorb	   and	   condense	   affective	   projections	  and	  internalisations.	  Giaco	   Schiesser	   aptly	   posits	   the	   term	  Eigensinn	   to	   describe	   the	   production	   of	  stubbornness	   that	   sustains	   the	   affective	   negotiation	   of	   media,	   materials	   and	  individuals	  during	   creative	  processes.	  He	   considers	   the	   confrontation	  of	   resilience	  between	  these	  elements	  in	  research-­‐creation	  to	  be	  the	  central	  motivating	  force:	  The	   Eigensinn	   of	   individuals	   is	   best	   described	   by	   the	   conscious-­‐unconscious,	   sometimes	   bizarre	   and	   often	   contradictory	   will	   to	   do	   that	  which	   they	   want	   to	   do,	   under	   whatever	   conditions,	   by	   their	   self-­‐determined	   actions	  …	   [the	  Eigensinn	   of	   the	  medium	   is	   described	   as	   the]	  undiscovered	  possibilities	  and	  obstinacies	  …	  [of	  the]	  materiality,	  structure,	  and	  technology	  specific	  to	  the	  chosen	  medium.40	  In	  research-­‐creation	  the	  technical	  dynamics	  of	  the	  media	  or	  material	  milieu	  become	  the	  intensive	  force	  for	  negotiating	  and	  modulating	  felt	  embodiment.	  The	  parameters	  of	   embodiment	   or	   the	   limits	   of	   sensation	   become	   the	   very	   subject	   of	   expression.	  How,	   then,	   can	   the	   procedural	   openness	   of	   material	   or	   media	   techniques	   in	  research-­‐creation	   transform	   collective	   willfulness	   towards	   sensory	   agency	   that	   is	  felt	  as	  a	  participatory,	  collective	  agency?	  Or,	  how	  can	  emergent	  sensation	  in	  media	  and	   material	   processes	   be	   applied	   to	   social	   contexts	   towards	   developing	   a	   more	  flexible	   and	   sensitive	   social	   milieu	   wherein	   emotionally	   and	   affectively	   charged	  boundaries	   and	   manners	   become	   a	   cite	   of	   creative	   negotiation	   rather	   than	  disciplinary	  enforcement?	  
—CLUMSY AGENCY Sara	   Ahmed	   considers	   unexamined	   affective	   or	   emotional	   compulsions	   to	   have	  important	  consequences	  for	  how	  people	  behave	  socially	  and	  politically:	  ‘attention	  to	  emotions	   allows	   us	   to	   address	   the	   question	   of	   how	   subjects	   become	   invested	   in	  particular	   structures	   such	   that	   their	   demise	   is	   felt	   as	   a	   kind	  of	   living	  death’.41	   For	  example,	  issues	  like	  nationalism	  and	  naturalisation	  often	  carry	  an	  affective	  charge	  of	  social	  belonging	  or	  exclusion.	  Ahmed	  considers	  the	  emotions	  that	  compel	  people	  to	  affirm	  issues	  like	  national	  borders	  to	  be	  a	  type	  of	  social	  stickiness:	   ‘To	  get	  stuck	  to	  something	  sticky	  is	  also	  to	  become	  sticky	  …	  stickiness	  then	  is	  about	  what	  objects	  do	  
	  	   	  VOLUME20 NUMBER2 SEP2014	  240 
to	  other	  objects—it	  involves	  a	  transference	  of	  affect—but	  it	  is	  a	  relation	  of	  doing	  in	  which	  there	  is	  not	  a	  distinction	  between	  passive	  or	  active.’42	  'Stickiness'	   is	   a	   compelling	  notion	  with	  which	   to	   critically	  engage	   the	   issue	  of	  how	   collectivities	   actively	   invest	   in	   distinguishing	   borders	   and	   people,	   not	   as	   a	  reasoned	  consideration	  of	   the	   issues	  at	  play,	  but	  as	  a	  charged	  emotional	  response.	  Like	   habitual	   compulsions,	   sticky	   issues	   or	   concerns	   are	   embedded	   in	   complex	  processes	  of	  affective	  embodiment.	  In	  habit	  we	  often	  get	  ‘stuck’	  to	  the	  path	  of	  least	  resistance	   wherein	   emotional	   and	   perceptive	   tendencies	   enable	   us	   to	   avoid	  confronting	  the	  felt	  abrasiveness	  of	  un-­‐sticking.	  This	  leaves	  us	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  developing	   techniques	   that	   can	   transform	   undifferentiated	   and	   unexamined	  sensations	   and	   experiences	   into	   active	   processes	   of	   sticking,	   unsticking	   and	  resticking.	   Ahmed	   proposes	   clumsiness	   as	   one	   possible	   technique	   that	   can	  undermine	  the	  continuity	  of	  such	  emotional	  lines	  of	  social	  and	  political	  affiliation.	  For	   Ahmed,	   clumsiness	   is	   an	   experience	   of	   non-­‐attunement,	   which	   disrupts	  social	   willing,	   which	   is	   a	   willing	   in	   time	   with	   others	   towards	   the	   aim	   of	  synchronicity.43	   Thinking	   of	   clumsiness	   in	   terms	   of	   non-­‐attunement	   or	   social	  dissynchrony	   implies	   that	   clumsiness	  disrupts	   the	   continuity	  of	   social	   anticipation	  by	   uncoordinating	   perceptive,	   temporal	   or	   scalar	   frequencies	   of	   action.	   To	   better	  understand	  how	  clumsiness	  might	  become	  an	  operative	  force	  in	  transforming	  social	  manners,	   it	   is	   first	   useful	   to	   examine	   the	   affective,	   homogenising	   glue	   of	   social	  synchronicity.	  	  Bergson	   specifies	   that	   the	   affective	   quality	   of	   synchronicity	   be	   expressed	   by	  grace.	  Grace	  has	  a	  way	  of	  aligning	  social	  sympathies	  in	  streamlined	  continuity.	  As	  we	  anticipate	  the	  temporal	  flow	  in	  the	  graceful	  motion	  of	  another,	   ‘we	  believe	  that	  we	  control	   them’.44	   This	   feeling	   of	   control	   over	   another	   has	   the	   corollary	   effect	   of	  evoking	   sympathy	   for	   the	   self.	   When	   we	   witness	   grace	  we	   anticipate	   a	   mobile	  sympathy,	  which	   is	   a	   ‘virtual	   and	  even	  nascent	   sympathy	   towards	  ourselves’.45	  To	  visually	   follow	   the	   graceful	   movements	   of	   another	   means	   to	   sympathetically	  anticipate	   and	   participate	   in	   their	   movement.	   Therefore,	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   align	  personal	  embodiment	   in	  projections	  of	   collectively	  anticipated	  embodiment.	  Grace	  is	   a	   relational	   phenomenon	   that	   is	   activated	   according	   to	   the	   degree	   to	   which	  individuals	  or	   communities	   collectively	   sympathise	  with	   it.	  The	  perceived	  grace	  of	  manners	   and	   social	   training	   is	   expressed	   in	   the	   subtlety	   and	   efficiency	   of	   one’s	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ability	  to	  successfully	  navigate	  and	  prioritise	  action	  according	  to	  the	  expectations	  of	  a	  given	  social	  milieu.	  Clumsy	  dyssynchrony,	  then,	  has	  the	  unfortunate	  side	  effect	  of	  generating	  an	  unsympathetic	  collective	  milieu.	  Clumsiness	   as	   a	   tactic	   of	   social	   transformation	   thus	   risks	   being	   actively	  distained,	  pushed	  aside	  or	  quickly	  made	  invisible	  for	  the	  very	  quality	  of	  it	  being	  out	  of	  time,	  out	  of	  place	  or	  out	  of	  scale.	  What’s	  worse,	  the	  social	  repercussions	  of	  being	  clumsy	   would	   be	   far	   more	   severe	   for	   those	   who	   already	   suffer	   from	   existing	  discriminatory	   paradigms	   or	   non-­‐attunement	   with	   the	   status	   quo,	   than	   for	   those	  who	  are	  implicitly	  sanctioned	  to	  move,	  act	  and	  participate	  freely.	  I	  anticipate	  that	  for	  clumsiness	   to	   produce	   lasting	   creative	   and	   transformative	   social	   frictions,	   it	  must	  exploit	  the	  awkwardness	  of	  non-­‐attunement	  and	  irresolution,	  while	  simultaneously	  generating	  social	  sympathies	  (or	  producing	  new	  forms	  of	  synchronicity).	  Clumsiness	  must	  be	  as	  attuned	  to	  developing	  the	  parameters	  of	  its	  context	  and	  embodiment	  as	  dancers	   are	   to	   the	   coordinated	  movements	   of	   the	   tango,	   or	   as	   potters	   are	   to	   the	  plastic	  weight	   of	   spinning	   clay	   or	   as	   scientists	   are	   to	   the	   scales	   and	   properties	   of	  measurement.	  I	   contend	   that	  research-­‐creation	   is	  an	   important	  relational	   stance	   from	  which	  to	   activate	   and	   sustain	   clumsy	   emergence	   as	   a	   creative	   force.	   Unlike	   victims	   of	  clumsy	   non-­‐attunement	   or	   those	  who	   suffer	   from	   and	   internalise	   the	   disciplinary	  social	   repercussions	   of	   not	   socially	   fitting	   in,	   research-­‐creation	   actively	   develops	  irresolution,	   incongruence	   and	   discontinuity.	   Moreover,	   these	   disruptive	  characteristics	   are	   not	   a	  means	   to	   an	   end,	   but	   actually	   sustain	   emergent	   thought,	  movement	  and	  perception.46	  The	  clumsiness	  that	  is	  developed	  through	  the	  affective	  friction,	  awkwardness	  and	  irresolution	  in	  creative	  material	  and	  media	  milieu	  has	  the	  effect	   of	   bothering	   attention	   so	   that	   it	   remains	   open	   to	   emergent	   affective	   and	  expressive	  motivation.	  	  We	  now	  see	  how	  developing	   sensitivity	   for	   emergence	   in	   the	   flux	  of	   affective	  body-­‐forming	   in	  attentive	  clumsiness	  might	  extend	  to	  developing	  more	  plastic	  and	  dynamic	  bordering	  processes	  in	  social	  and	  collective	  contexts.	  When	  the	  embodied,	  disciplinary	  sensitivities	  of	   social	  manners	  and	  distinctions	  are	  unfixed	   from	  rigid,	  habitual	   delineations,	   they	   can	   emerge	   as	   a	   dynamic	   topography	   for	   creative	  negotiation.	   Put	   otherwise,	   creative	   clumsiness	   initiates	   a	   process	   of	   shifting,	  plasticising	  and	  modulating	  emotional	   investment	   in	  exclusionary	  social	  behaviour	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by	   proposing	   processual,	   open	   irresolution	   and	   suspended	   anticipation.	   The	  discipline	   and	   manners	   that	   simultaneously	   inform	   material	   scripts,	   affective	  embodiment	  and	  affective	  impulses	  to	  exclusionary	  social	  behaviour	  would	  stand	  to	  be	   redistributed	   and	   transformed	   in	   the	   emergent	   perception	   of	   creative	  negotiation.	   Therefore,	   clumsiness	   could	   be	   an	   effective,	   systematic	   technique	   in	  research-­‐creation	   that	   resonates	   with	   the	   materiality	   and	   social	   dynamics	   of	  everyday,	  affectively	  charged	  experience.	  Choreographer	   Simone	   Forti	   shows	   us	   one	   example	   of	   how	   methodical	   and	  deliberate	   clumsiness—or	   the	   clash	   of	   material,	   formal,	   reflexive	   and	   theoretical	  registers—activate	   emergent	   embodiment	   via	   the	   openness	   of	   its	   own	   process.47	  Forti	   improvises	  with	   the	   surface	   and	  dimension	  of	   a	   small	   table	  by	   leaning	  on	   it,	  rolling	  under	   it	   and	   caressing	   the	   subtle	   taper	  of	   its	   legs.	  This	   tactile	   and	  physical	  relation	   with	   the	   table	   becomes	   a	   force	   of	   contingent,	   mobile	   stability	   as	   she	  proceeds	  to	  verbally	  describe	  her	   immediate	  physical	  sensations,	  details	  about	  her	  personal	   life,	  her	  thinking	  processes	  and	  her	  concern	  for	  various	   injustices	  around	  the	  world.	  We	  watch	  Forti’s	  spry,	  elderly	  body	  dance	   limberly	  with	  the	  small	   table	  and	  wonder	  at	   the	  strength	  of	  her	  bones	  compared	  to	   the	  rigidity	  of	   the	   table.	  We	  notice	  the	  material	  specificity	  of	  her	  body	  and	  the	  table	  in	  high	  relief.	  Her	  physical	  proximity,	   her	   liveness,	   oscillates	   between	   social,	   personal,	   linguistic,	   material,	  physical	  and	  narrative	  registers.	  When	  Forti	  laments	  social	  injustice,	  the	  realisation	  of	   the	   limitation	   of	   her	   current	   physical	   agency	   directs	   us	   to	   the	   paradoxes	   of	  reconciling	   tactile	   and	   embodied	   material	   immediacy	   with	   more	   general	   social	  concerns	   and	   representations.	   Forti	   can	   trace	   the	   taper	   of	   the	   table	   leg	   with	   her	  fingers	   but	   she	   cannot	   physically	   redistribute	   the	   wealth	   of	   the	   world	   to	   end	  poverty.	   Forti’s	   table	   choreography	   leaves	   many	   important	   social	   questions	  unanswered.	   But	   the	   social	   and	   ethical	   problems	   that	   Forti	   raises	   within	   the	  expressive	   embodiment	   of	   the	   performance	   milieu	   leaves	   open	   a	   propositional	  suggestion	  that	  resides	  in	  the	  sensory	  flux	  of	  embodiment	  itself.	  We	  are	  left	  with	  the	  affective	   impulse	   to	   collectively	   inhabit	   dynamic,	   empathetic	   and	   sympathetic	  openness	   in	   the	   ways	   that	   we	   physically,	   perceptively	   and	   affectively	   inhabit	   the	  everyday.	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—CONCLUSION The	  experience	  of	  habit	  often	  escapes	  textual	  description,	  despite	  its	  long	  history	  as	  a	   subject	   of	   theoretical	   and	   sociological	   discussion.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   very	  complexity	   with	   which	   we	   inhabit	   experience	   opens	   infinite	   entry	   points	   for	  developing	   techniques	   to	  modulate	   attention,	   sensation	   and	   embodiment.	  What	   is	  particularly	   important	   about	   research-­‐creation	   as	   a	   technique	   of	   agentive	  embodiment	  is	  that	  it	  sustains	  perceptive	  emergence	  via	  the	  dynamism	  or	  affective	  flux	  in	  process.	  Put	  otherwise,	  the	  tension	  between	  multiple,	  disparate	  registers	  and	  qualities	   of	   experience	   form	   a	   research	   ecology	   that	   persistently	   develops	   in	  emergent	  scope	  and	  complexity.	  	  Manning	  explicitly	  advocates	  working	   from	  multiple	  perspectives	   in	  research-­‐creation	   to	   maintain	   radical	   openness	   in	   creative	   research	   systems.	   In	   Creative	  
Propositions	   for	   Thought	   in	   Motion,	   she	   expounds	   propositions	   like	   ‘Edit	   from	  Within!’,	   ‘Value,	   don’t	   Evaluate!’,	   ‘Make	   Multiple	   Sense!’,	   ‘Speculate!’,	   ‘Create	   with	  Concepts!’,	  ‘Make	  the	  Relation	  Felt!’,	  ‘Engage	  Relations	  of	  Tension!’,	  ‘Create	  Degrees	  of	   Intimacy!’,	   ‘Forget	   what	   you	   Feel!’,	   ‘Transvaluate!’.48	   In	   processes	   that	   are	  governed	  by	  the	  potential	  in	  their	  very	  multiplicity,	  existing	  expectations,	  categories	  and	   locations	   are	   continually	   destabilised	   and	   renegotiated.	   A	   multiple	   research	  framework	   thus	   extends	   the	   agentive	   potential	   and	   immanence	   of	   inhabiting	   the	  world	  across	  disparate	  vectors.49	  Similarly,	  Bruno	  Latour	  emphasises	  the	  emergent	  potential	  of	  inclusive	  creative	  process,	  or	  'compositionist'	  methods	  that	  integrate	  textual,	  conceptual	  and	  sensory	  experiential	   registers.	   Latour	   states:	   ‘To	   capture	   all	   creative	   agencies,	  compositionists	   have	   to	   compose	  …	   [continuity]	   slowly	   and	   progressively	  …	   from	  discontinuous	   pieces.’50	   Once	   again	   we	   see	   that	   the	   very	   process	   of	   struggling	   to	  articulate,	   translate	   and	   relay	   experience	   across	   registers	   of	   meaning,	   experience	  and	   emergent	   sensation	   becomes	   an	   opportunity	   for	   creative	   embodiment.	   The	  advantages	  involved	  in	  engaging	  disparate	  sources	  in	  research-­‐creation	  thus	  extend	  beyond	   individual	   concerns.	   The	   plural	   and	   dynamic,	   non-­‐linearity	   of	   creative	  embodiment	   creates	   the	   context	   or	   means	   for	   collective	   participation	   in	   world-­‐creation.	  Creative	  openness	  towards	  diversity,	   incongruence,	   irresolution	  and	  non-­‐attunement	   in	   social	   contexts	   potentiates	  methods	   for	   inhabiting	  more	   persistent	  and	   deliberate	   forms	   of	   collective	   agentive	   embodiment. Therefore,	   the	   clumsy	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embodiment	   of	   research-­‐creation	   proposes	   a	   format	   for	   collective	   willing	   that	   is	  messy	   and	   uncoordinated	   but	   sustains	   the	   transformative	   potential	   of	   embodied	  emergence.	   The	   radicalism	   of	   this	   idea	   lies	   in	   the	   perceptive	   and	   affective	  subjectivity	   of	   social	   bodies.	   Therefore,	   the	   'clumsy'	   embodiment	   of	   research-­‐creation	   proposes	   a	   format	   for	   collective	   willing	   that	   is	   messy	   and	   unruly	   but	  sustains	   transformative	   potential	   in	   its	   emergence	   and	   openness	   across	   multiple	  vectors.	   The	   radicalism	   of	   this	   idea	   lies	   in	   the	   potential	   of	   the	   emergent	   flux	   of	  subjective	  experience	  in	  the	  doing	  of	  everyday	  processes,	  which	  disturbs	  categorical	  separations	   between	   individual	   and	   collective	   bodies.	   Therefore,	   the	   creative	  
tending	   to	   the	   flux	   of	   emergent	   experience	   means	   developing	   techniques	   and	  processes	   for	   actively	   inhabiting	   plastic	   emergence	   across	   existing	   boundaries	   of	  social	   distinction.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	  milieu	   of	   our	   immediate	   experience	   with	  everyday	  materialities	  is	  then	  a	  crucial	  tactic	  for	  initiating	  such	  processes.	  —	  Nicole	   De	   Brabandere	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